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GIVEN A HAMMER: TAX INCREMENT FINANCING ABUSE IN THE 
ST. LOUIS REGION 
JOE WILSON 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The St. Louis region is made up of 115 unique government entities: 90 
municipalities, the St. Louis County government, the City of St. Louis 
government, and 23 fire protection districts.1 Those 115 entities provide 
services for 1.3 million people at a cost of over $2.3 billion per year.2 The City 
of St. Louis, St. Louis County, and all the municipalities are fighting each 
other for the funding to keep their communities running. More than 40 
communities get at least half of the taxes they collect from sales tax revenue.3 
Some get upwards of 70% and even 80% of their total taxes from sales tax 
alone.4 Equally alarming, there are many communities whose total 
expenditures are equivalent, or nearly so, to the total sales tax revenues that 
they take in.5 These communities are positioned so that even slight economic 
downturns pose severe problems for the delivery of municipal services. 
Relying on retail to fuel the needs of local government is a risky venture, 
and many local governments will do whatever they can to gain an advantage 
because they feel compelled to compete against one another as the population 
of the region drops and economic development projects become scarcer.6 The 
fight for sales tax revenue has led cities in the St. Louis region to do anything 
possible to draw in big-box stores with their high sales tax receipts. Tax 
abatements, municipal bonds, and a host of other economic development tools 
have been used by cities to push for all types of development.7 Among these 
 
 1. BETTER TOGETHER, http://www.bettertogetherstl.com/about (last visited Oct. 21, 2014). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Better Together CAFR Database, BETTER TOGETHER (Feb. 2014), http://www.betterto 
getherstl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Better-Together-CAFR-Database-8.5x11.pdf. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. EAST-WEST GATEWAY COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECTIVENESS 
AND FISCAL IMPACTS OF THE USE OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES IN THE ST. LOUIS 
REGION: FINAL REPORT 64–65 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.ewgateway.org/pdffiles/li 
brary/dirr/TIFFinalRpt.pdf. 
 7. DENNY COLEMAN, BRIAN MURPHY & BETTER TOGETHER, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 7 
(May 2014), available at http://www.bettertogetherstl.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/ 
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development tools is tax increment financing, or TIF. TIFs have been used to 
promote, incentivize, and enable development across the region for a wide 
variety of excellent and much-needed projects.8 However, they have also been 
used to subsidize the development of a variety of big-box stores and other 
retail options in a region that is rife with such options already.9 
In the past twenty years, more than two billion public tax dollars have been 
diverted to developers as subsidies for private developments through tax 
increment financing across the St. Louis region.10 Tax increment financing has 
been used as a weapon of economic development against neighboring 
municipalities in the region.11 Every community’s leadership sees it as their 
duty to promote economic development by whatever means necessary, and if 
the mayor next door is willing to take action, then each community must be 
prepared to do the same if they are to remain competitive.12 Given a hammer, 
everything looks like a nail. Given a TIF, everything looks like blight. 
Following the introduction, Part II of this article will set out to explain 
exactly how tax increment financing functions in the St. Louis region. Next, it 
will discuss the structural problems that TIF creates. In Part IV, this article will 
discuss the difficult situation local governments find themselves in while 
trying to encourage economic growth. Part V will discuss the types of projects 
that are subsidized using tax increment financing, highlighting both the bad 
and good developments. Finally, this article will explore what we can do to 
create a better future for the regional economy. 
II.  TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN MISSOURI: THE 100,000-FOOT VIEW 
The creation and adoption of a TIF has several steps. First, a TIF 
commission must be established as prescribed in the TIF Act. Next, a 
redevelopment plan and cost-benefit analysis describing the economic impact 
of the TIF must be prepared. After the TIF commission is satisfied with the 
plan, it must hold a public meeting regarding the TIF plan. The TIF 
commission will then make a recommendation to the governing body of the 
municipality, which will either approve or disapprove the TIF.13 
Once a TIF is adopted, the assessed value of real property in the 
redevelopment area is locked in for a set number of years at the level prior to 
 
Better-Together-Economic-Development-Report-FULL-REPORT.pdf [hereinafter ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT REPORT]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1. 
 11. Id. at 12. 
 12. Id. at 1. 
 13. GILMORE & BELL, P.C., MISSOURI MUNICIPAL FINANCE GUIDE 27 (2012), available at 
http://www.gilmorebell.com/MO%20Muni%20Finance%20Guide%20%28Apr%202012%29.pdf 
[hereinafter MISSOURI MUNICIPAL FINANCE GUIDE]. 
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construction of improvements. The property owner will pay property taxes at 
that locked-in level. As the property is improved, the assessed value of the 
property within the TIF district should increase above the base level.14 Then, 
“applying the tax rate of all taxing districts with power in the redevelopment 
area to the increase in assessed valuation of the improved property over the 
base level” produces a “tax increment.”15 TIF “allows for the capture of 100% 
of local incremental real property taxes and 50% of local incremental 
economic activity taxes (i.e., sales, utility, and earning taxes) generated within 
a redevelopment area.”16 The tax increments, called “payments in lieu of 
taxes,” or “PILOTS,” are paid as if they were garden-variety property taxes by 
the property owner.17 The PILOTS are transferred by the collecting agency to 
the treasurer of the municipality.18 The money in this fund can be used to 
directly pay for redevelopment costs or to retire bonds or other obligations 
issued.19 
The City of St. Louis and St. Louis County have their own unique 
compositional formulas that are required for their respective TIF 
commissions.20 This commission is the group that calls the public hearings 




 14. GILMORE & BELL, P.C., SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TOOLS 2 (2014), 
available at http://www.gilmorebell.com/ED_Memo_7_28_14.pdf [hereinafter SUMMARY OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TOOLS]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. MISSOURI MUNICIPAL FINANCE GUIDE, supra note 13, at 27. 
 17. SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TOOLS, supra note 14, at 2. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 3. 
 21. Id. 
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ST. LOUIS COUNTY 
 
 
CITY OF ST. LOUIS 
CITY(IES)  3*  6 
SCHOOL DISTRICTS  2  2 







TOTAL MEMBERS  12  9 
* THESE MEMBERS ARE APPOINTED BY CITIES THAT HAVE TIF 
DISTRICTS IN THE COUNTY 
The second step involves the designation of the redevelopment area, which 
requires classification of the TIF district as a “blighted area,”23 a “conservation 
area,”24 or an “economic development area.”25 Once a project has been fit into 
one of the three categories described above, a redevelopment plan must be 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TOOLS, supra note 14, at 3–4 (A “blighted 
area” is defined as an area which, by reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street 
layout, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site improvements, improper subdivision 
or obsolete platting, or the existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire and 
other causes, or any combination of such factors, retards the provision of housing 
accommodations or constitutes an economic or social liability or a menace to the public health, 
safety, morals, or welfare in its present condition and use). 
 24. Id. at 4 (A “conservation area” is defined as any improved area within the boundaries of 
a redevelopment area located within the territorial limits of a municipality in which 50% or more 
of the structures in the area have an age of thirty-five years or more. Such an area is not yet a 
blighted area but is detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, or welfare and may become a 
blighted area because of any one or more of the following factors: dilapidation; obsolescence; 
deterioration; illegal use of individual structures; presence of structures below minimum code 
standards; abandonment; excessive vacancies; overcrowding of structures and community 
facilities; lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities; inadequate utilities; excessive land 
coverage; deleterious land use or layout; depreciation of physical maintenance; and lack of 
community planning). 
 25. Id. (An “economic development” area is defined as any area or portion of an area located 
within the territorial limits of a municipality, which does not meet the requirements of [a blighted 
area or conservation area], and in which the governing body of the municipality finds that 
redevelopment will not be solely used for development of commercial businesses which unfairly 
compete in the local economy and is in the public interest because it will: (1) discourage 
commerce, industry or manufacturing from moving their operations to another state; or (2) result 
in increased employment in the municipality; or (3) result in preservation or enhancement of the 
tax base of the municipality). 
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prepared. The TIF Act requires the following information to be included in the 
redevelopment plan: 
1. The estimated redevelopment project costs 
2. The anticipated source of funds to pay the costs 
3. Evidence of commitments to finance the project costs 
4. The anticipated type and term of the sources of funds to pay costs 
5. The most recent equalized assessed valuation of the property within the 
redevelopment area that is to be subjected to PILOTS and economic 
activity taxes 
6. An estimate of the equalized assessed valuation after redevelopment 
7. The general use of the land in the redevelopment area26 
Once the plan has been compiled, a public hearing about the adoption and 
implementation of the TIF plan must occur.27 Notice of the hearing must be 
published and mailed to the taxing districts and property owners affected.28 If a 
TIF commission for St. Louis County fails to take up the issue of the proposed 
redevelopment plan within thirty days after the public meeting, it will be 
deemed rejected by the commission.29 After the public hearing, the TIF 
commission must vote on whether to recommend acceptance or denial of the 
proposed TIF district.30 Once a recommendation has been made and approved, 
the municipality must adopt an ordinance for the TIF district.31 
III.  UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 
The previous section simplified the TIF process and glossed over many of 
the problems associated with TIF. These problems are both structural and 
interpretive. Regarding structure, the very people who are most affected by the 
TIF often have little say in the plan, despite the requirement of a public 
meeting. Further, the TIF commission lacks teeth to enforce its decisions, and 
the local government body charged with final approval of the TIF proposal is 
easily capable of overruling any determination made by the TIF commission or 
the general public. These structural problems are amplified by the interpretive 
challenges associated with TIF, which allow much broader use of TIF than 
originally intended. First, the term “blight” has mutated in meaning. Second, 
Missouri’s but-for test for TIF is an easily surmountable hurdle to acceptance. 
This section will explore these structural and interpretive problems in detail. 
 
 26. Id. at 5. 
 27. Id. at 6. 
 28. Id. 
 29. SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TOOLS, supra note 14, at 6. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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The first of the structural problems relates to the effectiveness of the TIF 
commission. The commission bears the responsibility of calling and holding 
the public input meetings.32 Those meetings are required by statute, and in 
theory, they provide an opportunity for public input about the use of tax 
increment financing in a community.33 However, this is not the case. Public 
engagement has become a “rite of bureaucratized democracy that is probably 
equal parts valued and despised by everyone involved in its legally mandated 
production.”34 Bill de Blasio, former New York City public advocate and 
current mayor, wrote that the Department of Education “treated [school closure 
hearings] as procedural hurdles in order to satisfy the letter of the law, rather 
than an opportunity to engage in a productive dialogue.”35 Political scientists 
decry public comment meetings as “processes that lack clear goals and metrics 
for assessment that help generate impact.”36 Truly troubling about the 
ineffectiveness of public meetings is that despite the number of meetings held, 
or the relative volume of the attendees of those meetings, the proposed plans 
may not see any change at all.37 The plan approved at the end of the process 
may substantively be the same plan that was proposed at the beginning, no 
matter the amount of opposition offered.38 Even if there is overwhelming 
opposition to the proposed TIF, there is no guarantee that public input will be 
respected or that plans will be adjusted in response.39 
Also frustrating in the process is that the people who use public meetings 
as the forum for their voice to be heard are, more often than not, the poorest 
people in the community and the most affected by the proposed plan.40 Poor 
Americans are less likely to be politically involved generally, but they are the 
most likely to engage locally in the form of meetings and rallies.41 Poor 
Americans are more likely to attend public meetings about schools, streets, and 
the future of their community than they are to vote for the next president.42 
When people believe their input has an effect on their immediate communities, 
participation rates between economic groups even out.43 However, those more 
 
 32. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.825 (2013). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Jake Blumgart, Shouting to be Heard: The Case for Rethinking Public Engagement, 
NEXT CITY, May 26, 2014, http://nextcity.org/forefront/view/the-case-for-rethinking-public-
engagement. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Blumgart, supra note 34. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
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affluent people with a desire to see change can provide support for candidates 
and issues in the form of money.44 This is an avenue for action that the poor 
lack.45 Establishing a TIF district in a poor neighborhood with an eye toward 
redevelopment bears the very real possibility that the poor living within the 
district will be forced to move elsewhere eventually, as rising real estate prices 
and rents push them out.46 Even if the poor in a community attend public 
comment meetings, their opinions may not be reflected in the final decision 
made, despite the fact that they might be the most adversely affected by the 
plan or are more numerous than the supporters of the plan.47 
The second of the structural problems is related to the final adoption of the 
TIF district by the municipality in which it will be located. In Missouri, a 
municipality is given the power to overrule a TIF commission’s 
recommendation against the establishment of a TIF.48 All that is required for a 
municipality to overrule the recommendation is a two-thirds vote of approval 
from the governing body, rather than a simple majority.49 In this way, the TIF 
commission and public hearings are relegated to an advisory role.50 Thus, 
while the ability of a municipality seeking a TIF to bypass a TIF commission’s 
recommendation is troubling in and of itself, it is especially troubling because 
it is so easy for a municipal government to accomplish. There are 584 
members of 92 governing bodies in the St. Louis region (St. Louis City, St. 
Louis County, and 90 municipalities in St. Louis County).51 On average, a 
governing body is composed of six members, which means that on average a 
governing body need only garner one additional vote to override a nine- or 
twelve-person panel that is specifically charged with watching over interests 
larger than those of single county or municipality.52 
While the structural problems associated with tax increment financing are 
significant, they are further aggravated by interpretive challenges. The first 
interpretive problem with tax increment financing is the use of the term 
“blight.” Blight, as the American legal system understood it during the first 
half of the twentieth century, was a condition of substandard, unsafe, or 
unsanitary housing.53 It made sense, then, to offer incentives to replace these 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban Renewal, Economic Development, and the 
Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 311 (2004). 
 47. Blumgart, supra note 34. 
 48. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 7, at 11. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Gordon, supra note 46, at 308. 
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substandard housing conditions with safe and sanitary housing.54 However, 
that meaning of blight has shifted. According to some legal scholars, 
“redevelopment policies originally intended to address unsafe or insufficient 
urban housing are now more routinely employed to subsidize the building of 
suburban shopping malls.”55 
As the above scholars implied, blight has come to have a far more 
expansive meaning than it previously did. It has come to encompass not just 
housing, but any dilapidated or obsolescent buildings, buildings with 
discontinued industrial uses, unimproved vacant land, or any land that is not 
being properly utilized.56 Again, legal scholars have explained that “in the 
scramble to TIF new retail developments in the St. Louis suburbs, . . . the 
designation of blight was typically sought after local development officials had 
reached a tentative agreement with a new anchor store.”57 The creation of retail 
stores and places to capture sales tax revenue took precedence over 
replacement of older industrial facilities, substandard commercial projects, or 
low-rent housing.58 As a result, slum clearance is no longer the primary 
meaning of blight.59 It now means anything that a developer or city would 
want out of the way for something else.60 Instead of encompassing something 
like a shanty with no electricity or plumbing, blight now grasps just about any 
structure that is not being used to its fullest potential. 
The West County Center is perhaps one of the St. Louis region’s more 
glaring examples of TIF used to subsidize retail where a subsidy should not be 
necessary. A mall in Des Peres, Missouri was “blighted” because it was too 
small and had too few anchor stores.61 This was no abandoned or underutilized 
mall in a dying suburb—it was in a well-heeled suburb. In fact, in 1997, the 
year of the TIF proposal, it was the second wealthiest suburb in the St. Louis 
region,62 and the developers simply wanted a Nordstrom and a Lord & Taylor. 
The mall was declared blighted, though it had almost 100% occupancy and its 
annual sales topped out at $100 million.63 As a result of this characterization, a 
massive expansion of the West County Center was undertaken, using Des 
Peres residents’ money.64 
 
 54. Id. at 315. 
 55. Id. at 307. 
 56. Id. at 314. 
 57. Id. at 322. 
 58. Id. at 317, 322. 
 59. Gordon, supra note 46, at 317. 
 60. Id. at 318. 
 61. Id. at 307. 
 62. Josh Reinert, Tax Increment Financing in Missouri: Is it Time for Blight and But-For to 
Go?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1019, 1019 (2001). 
 63. Id. at 1021. 
 64. Id. at 1019. 
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The second interpretive problem is TIF’s but-for test. In Missouri, a but-for 
test must be met prior to a TIF’s approval.65 Under this test, a governing body 
must find that the redevelopment area has not been subject to growth and 
development through private investment and is not reasonably anticipated to be 
developed “but for” the adoption of tax increment financing.66 In order to 
fulfill this requirement, such a determination must be submitted via an affidavit 
by the proposed developer along with the redevelopment plan.67 This test has, 
by many accounts including those of business and civic leaders, devolved into 
a requirement that is relatively easy to meet. Under this test, the developer 
must simply show that it would not undertake the development without the 
TIF, rather than show that the development would not be undertaken by 
anyone without the TIF.68 
This is an important trend, because freezing the property tax revenue 
during the TIF can negatively impact the encompassing school district.69 A 
non-TIF project could lead to increased revenues for the district.70 However, 
freezing the property tax for the length of a TIF prevents the district from 
benefitting from increased revenue that would have been available if a non-TIF 
project had developed in the same period.71 As it stands now, the municipality 
can override schools districts’ opinions.72 
Missouri municipalities need only “provide at least a modicum of evidence 
that the development would not occur without the subsidy,” and if they do, 
“Missouri courts will not interfere with the municipality’s determination that 
the but-for test is met.”73 In order to satisfy the but-for test, the municipality 
needs to simply deliver financial analysis of the project showing a gap between 
the expected costs and projected value.74 For example, a municipality may 
show a pattern of unsuccessful redevelopment efforts as evidence that the but-
for test is met.75 Ultimately, the threshold necessary to shield a but-for 
determination from judicial scrutiny is very low.76 
Missouri has created an economic development tool that is readily 
available and allows municipalities to chase sales tax revenue. When the lack 
of regional or state oversight is coupled with the fragmentation of the St. Louis 
 
 65. Id. at 1020. 
 66. Id. 
 67. SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT TOOLS, supra note 14, at 5–6. 
 68. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 7, at 12. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Reinert, supra note 62, at 1048. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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region, a perfect storm is created for widespread use of an economic tool that 
provides benefits to an individual municipality at the expense of the 
neighboring municipalities and the region.77 This is illustrated by a 2010 TIF, 
approved by the Bridgeton City Council, which provided $7.2 million in tax 
increment financing for the creation of a Wal-Mart on St. Charles Rock 
Road.78 This TIF was granted so that Wal-Mart could relocate an older store to 
a new site that was only two miles away and on the same road as the existing 
store.79 The older Wal-Mart was located in two municipalities: 93% of the 
store was in Bridgeton, while 7% was in St. Ann.80 When Wal-Mart announced 
it was seeking to move to another site with expanded space, Bridgeton stepped 
forward to retain the store and the sales tax revenue.81 Municipal leadership 
warned that Wal-Mart would simply close the smaller store and relocate to 
another city if Bridgeton refused to offer a TIF, and the store would take $1 
million in annual sales tax with it.82 This is not, as was the original intention of 
TIF, an example of growth for a region that was starving for growth. Instead, 
this was the shifting of sales tax revenues to whichever entity was willing to 
subsidize the most. The site of the original Wal-Mart remains undeveloped 
today83—an empty unused space 93% in Bridgeton and 7% in St. Ann, it is an 
albatross around the neck of both municipalities. 
As these examples make apparent, there are ingrained structural and 
interpretive challenges with tax increment financing that are stymying true, 
meaningful growth. Change is desperately needed to improve development in 
the region. 
IV.  A PRISONER’S DILEMMA IN THE ST. LOUIS REGION 
A prisoner’s dilemma is a paradox in decision analysis in which two 
individuals acting in their own best interest pursue a course of action that does 
not result in the ideal outcome.84 The typical prisoner’s dilemma is set up in 
such a way that both parties choose to protect themselves at the expense of the 
 
 77. Id. at 1037–38. 
 78. Margaret Gillerman, Walmart Store Gets Bridgeton’s Approval, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, July 8, 2010, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/metro/walmart-store-gets-bridge 
ton-s-approval/article_8d158273-5237-5e5d-b0d8-fc23c94dc3ff.html. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 7, at 12. 
 84. Xi Yang et al., Understanding Cooperation in a Single-Trial Prisoner’s Dilemma Game: 
Interactions Among Three Conditions, 41 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY: INT’L J. 721, 721 
(2013). 
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other participant.85 As a result, following a purely logical thought process, both 
participants find themselves in a worse state than if they had cooperated with 
each other in the decision-making process.86 
Evidence suggests that the use of TIF and other incentives provides a 
positive economic impact for the municipality utilizing the incentive while 
negatively impacting neighboring municipalities.87 With that in mind, it is 
difficult to fault the individual municipalities or their mayors for utilizing TIF 
and other means to garner as large a portion of the sales tax and other revenues 
as possible. Individually, there is very little that a municipality can do to alter 
the prisoner’s dilemma that has been created in pursuit of sales tax revenue.88 
Municipal leaders are faced with the unattractive choice of placing a tax 
initiative on the ballot or reducing services if they choose not to participate in 
the pursuit of this additional revenue.89 Rational self-interest urges the 
municipality to do what needs to be done to secure its own success, especially 
if the neighboring community is faced with the same situation and may choose 
an action that damages its neighbor.90 Fragmentation leaves municipalities 
chasing sales taxes and gives national chains, big-box stores, and developers 
the ability to leverage regional insecurities against municipalities.91 
A solution must be implemented at a regional or state level so that the 
competitive advantage of being the wealthiest market for hundreds of miles is 
restored in the St. Louis region, rather than placed in the hands of Wal-Mart 
and other big-box developers. 
V.  WHAT DEVELOPMENTS ARE WE FUNDING? 
A. Good TIF 
Not all uses of TIF are bad. Take, for example, the use of TIF in Pagedale. 
Pagedale is a relatively low-income community in North St. Louis County.92 
Chris Krehmeyer, Beyond Housing’s president and chief executive, said in a 
 
 85. See Wayne Eastman, How Coasean Bargaining Entails a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 72 Notre 
Dame L. Rev. 89, 91–92 (1996) (illustrating the typical prisoner’s dilemma). 
 86. See id. 
 87. EAST-WEST GATEWAY COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, supra note 6, at iv. 
 88. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 7, at 14. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 12. 
 91. Id. at 12, 14. 
 92. Christine Hoehner, How can we create a neighborhood environment that has health, 
social and economic benefits?, WASH. UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS INST. FOR PUB. HEALTH, http://public 
health.wustl.edu/people/Pages/Pagedale.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2014); Lisa Brown, One Year 
After Opening, Pagedale Bank Branch Fills Unmet Need, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 28, 
2013, http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/one-year-after-opening-pagedale-bank-branch-fills-
unmet-need/article_2ce0f560-200f-58da-9965-16c74470aea5.html. 
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St. Louis Post-Dispatch article that rebuilding communities requires better 
health care, more jobs, good education and economic development, and decent 
housing.93 Almost every one of those elements listed above was deficient in 
Pagedale. The area had seen very little development in recent decades.94 As a 
result, Beyond Housing, a nonprofit working in the region, recognized the need 
for specific types of development to improve the quality of life for residents.95 
Beyond Housing made the effort to establish TIF in an area where almost no 
one else would invest time or money.96 The TIF was about $6.1 million.97 
Beyond Housing and the Pagedale TIF might be able to get Pagedale out of 
the vicious cycle described above. While other, more traditional financing 
sources might balk at investing in one of the more dilapidated communities in 
the region, Pagedale was willing to try to reinvest in itself in a major way, with 
a developer who sees the value in working in the community.98 A Save-A-Lot 
grocery store, a Midwest BankCentre branch, and Rosie Shields Manor (low-
income senior apartments) went into the space developed by Beyond Housing 
first, and these developments have been transformative for the area.99 The 
grocery store is one of the few places where fresh food can be purchased in 
Pagedale.100 Midwest BankCentre is the first bank in the community.101 There 
were doubts about how the bank would preform in Pagedale, but it has been 
outpacing expectations. Officials had done a six-year projection on the 
numbers of accounts, volume of loans, and deposits to expect at the location.102 
Two years into existence, the bank is performing at year-four projections.103 
Most of the bank’s work comes in the form of low-cost checking accounts and 
home-improvement loans.104 The value the bank adds to the community is 
great, but it manifests in small ways. Midwest BankCentre’s presence in the 
community is actually allowing residents to improve the quality of the housing 
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stock on their own through small loans.105 This will help fuel higher assessed 
land values and, in turn, will funnel more money into education for the 
beleaguered Normandy School District,106 which Pagedale resides within. Like 
the Save-A-Lot grocery store and Midwest BankCentre, Rosie Shields Manor 
has been breathing life into the struggling community. The senior apartments 
provide adequate housing for individuals on low or fixed incomes. These older 
residents, who once lived in more dilapidated housing, are safe and secure in 
their new apartments with staff to help those who, through age or infirmity, 
would have trouble living independently. 
Krehmeyer describes his focus as broad, saying that “[y]ou have to focus 
on everything. The fabric of a place is never one thing.”107 Focusing solely on 
the housing stock of the region would have produced homes that nobody in 
Pagedale could have afforded to rent or buy, and those who could rent or buy 
the homes did not want to live in Pagedale because there were few jobs and 
poor schools.108 Focusing solely on bringing jobs to the region would have 
made it difficult to lure workers because of the low quality of housing stock 
and the absence of quality education.109 Focusing solely on reviving the 
flagging St. Louis public education system would have been nearly impossible 
because the quality of school districts is intrinsically tied to the quality of the 
housing stock and the employment of the region.110 Public education is funded 
by property taxes that are tied to the value of land, so homes with low assessed 
values provide less in tax revenues and may have trouble adequately 
supporting the school district.111 This is a vicious cycle that drags communities 
down.112 For any real chance at improvement, a municipality must break out of 
the cycle. 
The use of TIF in Pagedale is just one example of the good that this 
particular public financing mechanism can do, but its uses are varied. TIF can 
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be used to help fund projects that would have trouble getting off the ground 
because of location, as in Pagedale, or they can be used to help finance projects 
that are too large to be supported solely by traditional financing methods. 
Another example of a successful use of TIF is the St. Louis Innovation 
District. The district is a very carefully orchestrated plan combining the 
influence and reach of multiple institutions in the St. Louis region like Saint 
Louis University and Washington University in St. Louis.113 The TIF for this 
project is a whopping $463.1 million but could prove to be the future of the St. 
Louis region. Innovation districts are popping up all over the country and focus 
on the random collisions that make innovation happen in industry.114 Though 
they are still being defined, these new innovation districts have been 
characterized as having three features: “(1) a hyper-concentration of players in 
the innovation economy, from big industrial R&D labs to tiny start-ups; (2) the 
markers of so-called smart urbanism, like robust transit options, mixed-use real 
estate and walkability; and (3) a regular colliding of people with a range of 
talents and expertise.”115 Further, “these districts are geographic areas where 
leading-edge anchor institutions and companies cluster and connect with start-
ups, business incubators, and accelerators.”116 A Brookings Institute report 
explains the value of these innovation districts by describing how they help 
metro regions move up the “value chain of global competitiveness by growing 
the firms, networks, and traded sectors that drive broad-based prosperity.”117 
Their value is also high because they address challenges in the business 
environment like sluggish growth, national austerity, and local fiscal 
challenges.118 
The innovation district, called Cortex in the St. Louis region, is seeking to 
achieve all three of those markers listed above.119 The innovation district is 
trying to lure young professionals who want to start new businesses with the 
goal that the professionals will call the region home for a very long time.120 
Cortex is also described in that report as of the “anchor plus” variety of 
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innovation districts.121 The anchor plus model is “primarily found in the 
downtowns and mid-towns of central cities” where “large scale mixed-use 
development is centered around major anchor institutions and a rich base of 
related firms, entrepreneurs and spin-off companies involved in the 
commercialization of innovation.”122 Cortex is located between the two largest 
educational institutions and medical facilities in the region: Saint Louis 
University and Washington University in St. Louis.123 This innovation district 
is seen, quite literally, as the future of business in the St. Louis region.124 
The Brookings Institute report makes the case for the importance of 
innovation districts, stating first that “innovation districts further the ability of 
cities and metropolitan areas to grow jobs in ways that both align with 
disruptive forces in the economy and leverage their distinct economic 
position.”125 That is, the creation of an innovation district does not hem a 
community into one field, nor is it only particularly useful for a single 
industry.126 Clustering individuals, established companies, sprightly start-ups, 
and people with the capital to fund new ideas can be a way for any community 
in the country to start to grow its local economy again.127 
Second, the report states that “innovation districts can specifically 
empower entrepreneurs as a key vehicle for economic growth and job 
creation.”128 Entrepreneurs’ place in the economy prior to the Great Recession 
was slightly different than their place today.129 Before, they were present but 
hardly lauded members of the business world.130 Today, they are some of the 
most sought-after members of the community.131 Having a thriving start-up 
economy in a region and being viewed as desirable by entrepreneurs is now a 
marker of prestige in the post-recession era.132 These entrepreneurs can create 
the next Google or Amazon. They can create jobs and taxable revenue like few 
companies before them, and with amazing speed as well.133 
Third, innovation districts can serve to minimize the inequality in a 
community. This is because they are able to “grow better and more accessible 
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jobs at a time of rising poverty and social inequality.”134 Learning coding or 
web design does not necessarily require advanced, or even college, degrees.135 
Computers have democratizing effects on the economy.136 
Fourth, the Brookings Institute contends that “innovation districts can 
reduce carbon emissions and drive denser residential and employment patterns 
at a time of growing concern with environmentally sustainable 
development.”137 Sustainable development that is at odds with the sprawling 
development surrounding the central city of St. Louis seems like a goal that is 
out of step with many of the others.138 Yet taken with the final important facet 
of innovation districts, it makes more sense.139 
Finally, “innovation districts can help cities and metropolitan areas raise 
revenues and repair their balance sheets at a time when federal resources are 
diminishing and many state governments are adrift.”140 Pairing the goals of 
sustainable development in the region with a sustainable local budget makes 
sense.141 Sprawling development requires more resources spread over a wider 
region.142 More miles of roads and sewer must be constructed and maintained 
in order to service residents that live across ever-expanding exurbs.143 Denser 
development keeps the infrastructure costs lower and keeps the tax base for a 
community more densely settled in one place, as opposed to spreading it across 
the region.144 The report cites this aspect as an important feature of innovation 
districts because it is a remarkable departure from much of the development 
strategies used prior. Sprawling suburban research campuses were costly not 
just to build, but to maintain as well. Denser development can reduce the long-
term costs of maintaining infrastructure by reducing the amount that must be 
replaced and increasing the number of taxpaying entities in the space that will 
pay into the maintenance of the facilities. 
This innovation district is meant to be an investment in the future of the 
region, much the same way the Pagedale TIF is viewed as an investment in the 
future of that community. Cortex would not have happened, due mainly to the 
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substantial size of the investment upfront, if not for tax increment financing.145 
The Pagedale development would not have happened, due to the location in a 
depressed or blighted neighborhood, if not for tax increment financing.146 
These are the “good TIFs.” These are major developments, publicly 
subsidized, to make meaningful change happen. These are also, sadly, not the 
norm.147 
B. Bad TIF 
It is, perhaps, unfair to characterize these instances of tax increment 
financing as “bad TIFs,” but it is unfortunately apt in some instances.148 The 
Gravois Bluffs Redevelopment Project (Fenton, MO), Ballwin Town Center 
TIF Redevelopment (Ballwin, MO), and Highway 141/Manchester Road 
Redevelopment Area (Manchester, MO) are all projects located in St. Louis 
County where the major focus of each project was centered on retail 
development.149 Wal-Mart, Marshalls, Kohl’s, Petco, OfficeMax, Target, Best 
Buy, Bed Bath & Beyond, Lowe’s, Stein Mart, and other chain restaurants 
provide considerable amounts of sales tax revenue for the municipality that 
each development is in.150 
As this article has already discussed, there is a constant fight happening 
between the municipalities of St. Louis County for sales tax revenues.151 In 
that constant battle, TIF is the primary weapon and sales tax revenue from big-
box retail development is the ultimate spoils of war.152 Tax increment 
financing abuse has made “subsidies a permanent fixture of development in 
our community.”153 But too many TIFs have failed at their one purpose: 
economic growth. The East-West Gateway Council of Governments concluded 
that TIFs “have created jobs in our community at the rate of one retail job for 
every $370,000 in taxpayer subsidies. That is not the road to growth—it is a 
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road to poverty.”154 Tax increment financing abuse “has authorized local 
leaders to make tax decisions that may benefit their immediate city at the 
expense of everyone else.”155 If one municipality succeeds at the cost of all 
municipalities surrounding it, then one can hardly say that the economy is 
improving at all. 
The realities of tax increment financing in the region are unfortunate for 
many. An East-West Gateway Council of Governments report from 2011 
suggests that for every $1 million of TIF investment, about six or seven jobs 
and about $400,000–$500,000 in taxable sales are added to that zip code.156 
That same $1 million TIF investment, however, corresponds to a $14,000 loss 
in taxable sales for the community next to the TIF.157 Every $10 million in TIF 
investment in a single community also corresponds to a loss of one job in 
every municipality in the region.158 Tax increment financing is not being used 
to fuel development, draw in outside investment, or lure new residents to a 
community.159 It is being used to shift the same jobs and tax revenues from one 
municipality to the next.160 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The utility of tax increment financing cannot be denied, and in fact, it is a 
tremendously useful tool that is available to large and small communities alike. 
TIF has been used to make many useful and worthwhile developments a 
reality. Yet it has also been used to publicly subsidize the developments of 
giant national and multinational retailers. The issue, then, should not be 
whether tax increment financing is used at all, but instead what can be done to 
guard the community against the abuse of this economic development tool. 
Reforming the TIF Commission so that it has some greater power to 
enforce or push for the determination it comes to, limiting the ease with which 
a municipal government can override the TIF commission determination, 
narrowing the definition of the term “blight” to be less all-encompassing, and 
shoring up the weak Missouri but-for test would go a long way in eliminating 
the abuse of tax increment financing in the St. Louis region. The prisoner’s 
dilemma St. Louis municipal leadership finds itself in is one of the driving 
factors for TIF abuse in the St. Louis region. If the leadership of the 
municipalities of St. Louis County and the City of St. Louis would work more 
closely, and with less of an eye toward undercutting each other, TIF abuse 
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would also be reduced. This would require and promote a greater sense of 
regional unity as opposed to regional competition. Yet if regional unity is 
paired with structural and interpretive changes to TIF use, the region should be 
able to shake the habit of using tax increment financing everywhere, for 
everything. 
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